Classical Realism is also known as Realpolitik. Because the tenets of Classical Realism are well
known, I will not inlcude them here. Classical Realism has a number of defining
characteristics: “denotes a certain
hard-headed, unromantic, uncompromising attitude towards the world, which
manifests itself in a brutal honesty and candor in the assessment of human motives
and the portrayal of human affairs (B,
2001).” The pragmatism, the amorality, the willingness
of its practitioners to get their hands dirty are all strengths of Classical
Realism because they give it an inherent adapatability.
When we take the quotes below into
consideration it isn’t hard to see why Classical Realism works. The pragmatism
means that rather than wanting the world to fit our ideals, that we work within
the reality of it. This Pragmatism is best exemplified by Napoleon: Never interrupt your enemy when he is making
a mistake. Morgenthau puts it this way:
Whatever the ultimate aims of
international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Napoleon was
only too happy for his opponents to win his battles for him. It is an example
of Classical Realism willingness to use an opponents weaknesses against them.
Morgenthau is much blunter and simply tells us the goal of the exercise. The
goal is one thing, how we achieve it is another.
Özlem Punar (Punar) argues that
contrary to Classical Realism’s pessimissm in regards to supranational bodies
such as the UN, that organisations such as the UN do work and cites this as
proof that Classical Realism doesn’t work. There is of course a glaring problem
with Punar’s criticism: The UN’s ICISS (International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty ) intervention in Libya during its recent
civil war has been argued as being an example of the successful application of
Classical Realism. Harry Kazanis (Kazanis, 2011) argues that the intervention was an exercise
of Classical Realism that achieved humanitarian and economic goals.
There was also that problem that with
Kissinger[1] and Morgenthau
active as a diplomat and a foreign policy advisor respectively, the US has assiduously
used the UN Security Council to achieve its goals. The pragmatists used the embodiment of the
counter argument to their theories in order to achieve their goals. Thus
proving that Classical Realism does work. If Classical Realism doesn’t work and the UN
is proof of this, then why were Classical Realists able to use it to achieve
goals? Which leads us to the next point.
Amorality is a strength of
Classical Realism because it gives freedom of action. There are no artificial
constraints on actions that can be taken in pursuit of goals. In other words:
Do whatever it takes to get the job done. The amorality is clear in Kissinger: The illegal we do immediately. The
unconstitutional takes a little longer and Machiavelli: “Politics have no relation to morals”. Thus, amorality is a recognition that
in order to achieve the desired and paramount outcome of security that there
are times “that good men need to do bad things”.
Classical Realism’s qualities as a
theory, the aspects of which I have listed above and with which its critics
have so many problems do have its apologists. Brian Leiter (Leiter, 2010)
certainly has no problems arguing the case for it. Morgenthau (Morgenthau,
1948) certainly makes his argument for Classical Realism. Brian A. Keaney
(Keaney, 2006) agrees with Morgenthau.
David. L. Perry criticises
Classical Realism as a ”Repugnant Philosophy” (Perry,
1995) because it does operate in an “ethics free
zone”. Yet in the same article we find this quote: “Even as persistent a critic of government secrecy as Sissela Bok
nonetheless grants that deception can occasionally be justified in national
defense: "Honesty ought not to allow the creation of an emergency by the
enemy, when deception can forestall or avert it. . . . Whenever it is right to
resist an assault or a threat by force, it must then be allowable to do so by
guile." We cannot have things both ways Mr Perry. Either something is
immoral and is rejected or it is immoral and accepted. If the critics keep
contradicting themselves there is only one conclusion that can be reached.
And the criticism by Perry et al clearly
relates to the willingness by practitioners of Classical Realism to get
themselves “dirty”, in other words “practice what they preach”. This is
exemplified by the Iran-Contra Affair, where the US was selling arms to the
Iranians who were obstensibly their enemies at the time in order to fund their
friends, the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. Kissinger said: “Intellectuals are cynical and cynics have never built a cathedral”.
Utopian ideals are fine, but the world manifestly isn’t a Utopia. It is observably what Classical Realism holds it to
be: nasty, amoral, and hypocritical. A desire
for a Utopia doesn’t bring it about. That takes hard-nosed work.
Howard Zinn (Zinn, 1997) has as his main
criticism of Classical Realism because it isn’t Utopian. Yet at no point does
Classical Realism even pretend to enter the neighbourhood of Utopianism. It can
be argued, and Zinn inspite of his above stated criticism, certainly does, that
US foreign policy post World War 2 and in particular during the Cold War has
been entirely Classical Realist in nature. In other words: US foreign policy
during and after the Cold War has been anything but Utopian in nature. Zinn
concedes that the Classical Realists who advised and were diplomats for the US
government during this period in fact won the Cold War (New (Keaney, 2006)mann, 2010).
Being able to change the rules to
suit yourself and your objectives because you aren’t particularly concerned
with ethics is a clear strength. Morgenthau says: “Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political
action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command
and the requirements of successful political action.” This also neatly illustrates the inherent
structural adaptability of Classical Realism, which brings us back to the
pragmatism. Wishing the world to be other than the way it is is the equivalent
of changing the facts to fit the theory. Classical Realism changes the theory
to fit the facts.
The above points illustrate what even most fiercest of its
critics acknowledge and is indeed the only logical conclusion: that Classical
Realism works. Why does Classical Realism as an Internation Security theory succeed
in ways that the other theories don’t? Because Classical Realism is pragmatic, is
amoral, has the willingness of its practitioners to get their hands dirty, all
of which gives it an inherent adapatability.
Bibliography
Zinn. H. “The Zinn Reader:
Machiavellian Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Means and Ends” page 336
[1]
http://search.un.org/search?ie=utf8&site=un_org&output=xml_no_dtd&client=UN_Website_en&num=10&lr=lang_en&proxystylesheet=UN_Website_en&oe=utf8&q=Kissinger&Submit=Go
